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Banks provide insurance against interest rate shocks and real shocks.
After the introduction of the common currency the credit system tends
to take more of the risk of the private sector, reducing the overall risk
of the economy and increasing the risk sharing among diﬀerent coun-
tries and regions. The increased diversiﬁcation that the introduction
of the Euro has allowed, has increased the smoothing of interest rate
shocks, but it has increased the incentive to smooth real shocks un-
evenly. The integration of the credit system, where the authority
to regulate national banking system is transferred to the ECB, would
change in a relevant way the reaction of the banking system to shocks.
The model shows that asymmetries in the transmission of monetary
policy would be reduced. On the other hand, a common market for
banking activities might tend to amplify the asymmetric impact of
real shocks.
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11 Introduction
When the intermediation of the banking system takes place, banks select
investment projects on the basis of their risk-return proﬁle. The investment of
specialized resources in the discovery and analysis of information reduces the
overall risk of the economic system. Banks bear part of the entrepreneurial
risk themselves; ultimately banks share the risk they undertake among the
holders of their own liabilities: shareholders and depositors. The activity
of the bank at the same time reduces the risk of the economic system, and
distributes the risk to a vast set of agents. The crucial diﬀerence between a
bank and a mutual fund is linked with the activity of lending by means of
loans and borrowing by means of deposit liabilities. The peculiar information
content of the contractual agreements based on relationship lending of these
securities, contributes to a better selection of the projects, reducing the risk,
given expected returns, that the whole economy undertakes. It is important
to observe that the bank takes this entrepreneurial function only issuing
diﬀerent categories of loans. If the bank invests its portfolio of assets on
bonds negotiated in the market, on which it has no peculiar information, it
will work as a mutual fund, redistributing overall risk, not reducing it.
The composition of the portfolio of securities of credit intermediaries is
fundamental in order to study the risk-taking and risk sharing activity of the
ﬁnancial sector. Changes in the relative share of government securities and
market securities in the portfolio of banks, not only aﬀect the risk proﬁle
of the credit institutions, but aﬀect the overall level of risk of the economic
system. The choice among diﬀerent sets of market assets, such as bonds or
diﬀerent classes of loans, has the same kind of inﬂuence. In section two,
a Markovitz type of mean variance portfolio model is derived for a banking
intermediary. The model is used in the following chapter to analyze the eﬀect
of shocks on the portfolio, both interest rate shocks and real shocks, and to
study how the credit sector in Europe has been aﬀected by the introduction
of the euro. The results of our model are consistent with the most recent
empirical evidence and shed some light on the driving forces determining the
behavior of banks. They show that in the event of a monetary policy shock
that increases rates, banks tend to rely more on relationship lending. As a
consequence they tend to smooth this kind of shocks. When a real shock
hits the economy, aﬀecting the entire structure of relative prices, the bank
perceives it as credit quality shock, that increases default costs. In the case
of real shocks, the degree of diversiﬁcation among industrial sectors of the
2assets of the bank plays a crucial role. Diversiﬁcation in fact increases the
opportunity cost for banks of intertemporal smoothing, increasing the cost
of the insurance for those ﬁrms that are negatively aﬀected by the shock.
Banks that beneﬁt from a widely diversiﬁed portfolio, create an internal
capital market to allocate resources. When the shock hits the economy, they
can choose to provide more liquidity to the ﬁrms positively aﬀected by the
shock, that have a lower expected default cost. As a consequence, they will
provide insurance to the ﬁrms badly aﬀected by the shock, only if they can
aﬀord to pay a higher average interest rate.
The development of the common currency has increased the availability
of diﬀerent private sector assets. At the same time it has pushed forward
the privatization of entire industrial sectors, and has allowed the exploitation
of large economies of scale in diﬀerent sectors of the economy. Risk-sharing
among European countries and regions has increased, because households
and ﬁnancial intermediaries hold now a more widely diversiﬁed portfolio. But
the risk attitude of the credit sector is peculiar, and it has been aﬀected in
a counterintuitive way by the institutional transformations of the European
economy. According to our model, the introduction of the common currency
has caused the credit system to reduce the holding of state bonds in favor
of market securities. As a consequence, banks have been pushed to take on
more of the risk of the private sector, reducing the overall risk of the economy
and increasing the risk sharing among diﬀerent countries and regions. The
last part of the work is a study of the eﬀect of the eventual development
of a common European banking system, subject to the same legislation and
where the power to monitor and regulate the market is delegated to a common
authority. The integration of the credit system would change in a relevant
way the reaction of the banking system to shocks. The model shows that
asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy would be reduced, as
the tendency to smooth monetary policy shocks would be increased. On
the other hand a common market for banking might tend to amplify the
asymmetric impact of real shocks.
32 The portfolio problem of the bank
Markovitz type of portfolio models are based on the assumption that returns
and risks are exogenous, and the quantities of each security held represent
the choice variable of the bank. In order to take into account the eﬀect of
information costs and default costs in the portfolio choice, we describe the
problem of the bank as a two-stage process. We assume that the bank classi-
ﬁes diﬀerent available groups of assets or liabilities in categories, on the basis
of institutional properties and of the sector of activity of the counterpart. In
the ﬁrst stage, the bank evaluates the optimal amount of investment in in-
formation that is worth taking for every class of security that it might choose
to hold. External information is available to any participant in the market
at a relatively small cost, that we will consider to be part of the transaction
cost necessary to purchase the security. on the contrary, certain categories
of assets and liabilities, such as deposits and many classes of loans, are avail-
able to banks only. Relationship lending allows the bank to obtain internal
information that is not available to the market in general, but in order to
establish the relationship the bank has to bear an information cost.
Assuming the existence of a competitive market, where rates are set ex-
ogenously, the problem can be formulated as the optimal choice of loan quan-
tity and investment in information.1 Information aﬀects the returns of the
bank reducing expected default costs. The default probability can be for-
malized as a function of the information regarding the single loan and the
quantity of the loan itself. The expected return of a loan is:
E[¼] = rLL ¡ p(1 + rL)L ¡ FC ¡ sz, (1)
where rL is the interest rate on loans, L is the quantity of the loan, FC is a
ﬁxed cost, sz is the cost of information and p is the subjective evaluation on
part of the lender of the probability of default of the single loan. p is deﬁned
as
p = f(q;l) = f(z + a;L). (2)
The parameter a represents the available stock of information, accumulated
in previous periods through relationship lending, z is the amount of infor-
mation that the bank can obtain in the short run, incurring in a cost that
for simplicity is assumed to be linear and equal to sz. The investment in
1As in Aigner and Sprenkle [1].
4information is worthwhile as long as the reduction of default cost that it pro-
duces is larger than the cost of the information. Under standard assumptions
regarding the cost functions, there will be an optimal amount of investment
in information z, and an optimal quantity of the single loan L, that mini-
mizes the default cost. It is important to observe that the level of the default
cost will crucially depend on the value of the stock a, that depends on the
investment entertained in the past. The investment in information reduces
the default cost of every single loan and the average default cost of a class of
loans, given the exogenously determined possibility of diversiﬁcation inside
the particular class. It is the availability of internal information, obtained
through relationship lending, that allows the bank to reduce the average cost
of default, while the market cannot reduce default costs by means of the
available external information. The bank accordingly classiﬁes the securities
under consideration in the portfolio problem, calculating an expected return
for every security (and the corresponding expected variance), composed of
three terms: the basic interest rate component, the transaction cost (that
includes mainly the cost of obtaining and processing the information), and
the default cost. Every class contains many diﬀerent securities, but we will
assume that the choice of the quantity of every security inside the class is
ﬁxed in the ﬁrst stage. The degree of diversiﬁcation inside a class is very
important, but we assume that it depends on the peculiarities of the sector
itself. For example we can imagine that as a policy the bank chooses to
issues mortgages of amounts lying within a predeﬁned range. The degree of
diversiﬁcation of the whole portfolio of mortgages is constant, and depends
on market conditions at the moment of the ﬁrst-stage decision. Mortgages
are a class of loans that are diversiﬁed to a certain degree which is higher
than the one for other types of loans, for example industrial loans, because
the mortgages are issued in larger numbers of smaller loans than are loans to
industrial ﬁrms. We will study the portfolio choice among diﬀerent classes.
2.1 Portfolio theory and banks
The Markovitz portfolio approach has been applied to banks and other ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries, assuming banks to be risk averse agents that maximize
a concave utility function where proﬁts are the argument. Assuming all re-
turns to be exogenous, the optimal portfolio of assets and liabilities is jointly
determined. This work is based on the model developed by Hart and Jaﬀe
[7]. The main result of the model is a separation theorem that shows that
5the choice of the optimal composition of the portfolio (in terms of the rela-
tive size of asset shares) is independent from the choice of the optimal size
of the portfolio itself. The other major results are some comparative static
properties, that we use largely in this work. In order to establish the com-
parative static results, only a fairly general assumption regarding the utility
function is required. The requirement is that the utility function exhibit non-
increasing absolute risk aversion. This restriction is often considered to be
acceptable in general, and seems very reasonable for a ﬁnancial intermediary.
The main ﬂaw of the model is that under the assumption that interest rates
on assets are higher than on liabilities, the bank might be willing to expand
its portfolio indeﬁnitely. This problem though can be solved, introducing the
innovations proposed by Szeg¨ o [22].
The model of Hart and Jaﬀe assumes that there are no risk free assets and
that net worth of the intermediary is a small part of its liabilities and can be
set to 0 or considered as another liability. The bank chooses simultaneously
the optimal quantity of both assets and liabilities; liabilities have a negative
sign, assets a positive one. A portfolio is represented by the vector x, with
j+i X
l=1
xl = 0, (3)
where the index j represent liabilities and i assets and the ﬁrst j components
are non positive while the last i are non negative. Assuming Ri to be a
random variable that measures the real return of the security, the expected
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Imposing a restriction on the utility function, the Arrow-Pratt hypothesis
of non-increasing absolute risk aversion, some interesting comparative static
6result can be obtained.2 The main results of their comparative static analysis
are synthesized in the following theorems3:
1. If the expected return on one security rises, ceteris paribus, the quantity
of the security held does not fall. If the quantity held is not zero, it
will rise.
2. If the covariance of two securities rises, ceteris paribus, the product of
the two quantities does not rise. If the product of two is diﬀerent from
0 (if both securities are held in the portfolio) the product itself falls.
3. If the variance of any security rises, ceteris paribus, the absolute value
of the quantity held will not rise. If the quantity held is not zero, it
will fall.
The second result holds either if the two securities are both assets or both
liabilities or if one of is an asset, the other a liability. The interpretation
of the result is opposite, in the two cases. When the two assets have the
same sign, the theorem states that an increase in the covariance determine
a reduction in the quantity held of both, or if one of the two is increased,
the reduction in the other one has be larger. On the other hand, when one
of the securities is a liability, the other an asset, since they have opposite
signs, the eﬀect of the increase of the covariance on the quantities held is
opposite. If the covariance increases, the quantity held of both securities
is increased, or the quantity of one of the two is reduced, the quantity of
the other is increased more than proportionately. The reason is that since
the two securities have opposite sign, a stronger covariance is analogous to
a higher negative correlation between two assets in the standard portfolio
problem. So the bank is willing to increase the holding of the two, because
it can hedge the asset buying the correlated liability or the other way round.
2In order to rule out the possibility of the existence of riskless non-zero portfolios
some assumption regarding S is required. The simplest possible is that S is positive
deﬁnite, assumption that implies that no riskless security is part of the portfolio. A
weaker assumption is suﬃcient, that implies that no two securities can be riskless:
x0Sx > 0. (5)
The other important assumption of the model is that there is not a positive and ﬁxed net
worth component of liabilities.
3Hart and Jaﬀe, 1973,[7] pp. 140.
72.2 Assets returns
2.2.1 Interest rate component
The deﬁnition of diﬀerent risk categories is necessary in order to model the
portfolio choice of a bank and its behavior towards risk. Our main aim is to
evaluate diﬀerent diversiﬁcation policies. Accordingly we analyze the factors
aﬀecting single banks, leaving aside systemic risk due to the possibility of a
bank run, that we will consider to be dealt with by public authorities. We do
not consider a second factor that could be relevant. Diﬀerent arrangements
of the capital structure could possibly guarantee diﬀerent levels of protection
from the exposure to exogenous factors, but to focus on the main problem,
we consider the capital structure of the bank to be irrelevant, at least in the
ﬁrst instance.
The set of risk factors aﬀecting the balance sheet of the bank is assumed
to be exogenous. We consider returns from the portfolio to depend on three
distinct sets of factors: interest rates, default costs and transaction costs.
Interest rates are assumed to be exogenous and to depend on a rate set
by the central bank, whose variations determine a shift of the return of all
assets. Diﬀerent securities available to the banking ﬁrm are characterized by
a diﬀerent mark up (normally positive, negative in the case of deposits) with
respect to the interest rate set by the central bank:
ri = rcb[1 + f(i)]; (6)








Every asset return is subject as well to an idiosyncratic shock, that we assume










where the subscript e indicates the expected values.
The securities we are considering could be both assets and liabilities. The
main diﬀerence in the problem of the bank is that they enter in the portfolio
with an opposite sign. Since the basic portfolio model requires returns to be
set exogenously, what we are implicitly assuming is that banks divide loans
and deposits in classes, whose interest rates are set according to a ﬁxed rule,
as a mark up on the interest rate set by the central bank.
82.2.2 An expected default cost function
In every period, the bank has to forecast return and variance of its portfolio
of loans. The problem we are considering here is the evaluation of those
factors of risk that aﬀect the probability of default of the loans that com-
pose the portfolio. Our assumption is that on the basis of the stock of its
private information, due to past and current investment, the bank makes its
evaluation of the risk factors aﬀecting every single loan.
The probability of default of single individual loans can be considered
to be aﬀected by idiosyncratic shocks, that we assume to behave as random
walk with a drift. Formally




where Uit is the speciﬁc risk factor of the ith loan, with i = 1:::n; ¹ is the
drift factor, and ² is the error term. The expected value is
E[Uit] = Ui0 + ¹it, (10)
the variance
V ar[Uit] = t¾
2
². (11)
The risk for the portfolio of loans that deﬁne every class is a weighted average,
with weights represented by the share of the ith loan in the entire portfolio,
that we will measure as hi =
Li
L . The share of every loan inside a class is
exogenous, because the optimal quantity of every loan is established in the
ﬁrst-stage process, together with the optimal investment in information. The















hi(Ui0 + ¹it), (13)













i is in fact a standard measure of concentration
and it is equal to 1 only when the entire portfolio is concentrated on a single
loan.
Because of the existence of asymmetric information and uncertainty, vari-
ation of interest rates aﬀect the probability of default of borrowers. In order
to show the eﬀects of interest rates on the default cost function of the bank,
we introduce a function that shows the link between default probabilities and
interest rates variations.4 The function ®(LR) shows how the probability of
default of the single borrower is increasing in the amount of the interest factor
LR. It measures the sensibility of the default cost to variation in the interest
rate factor and it is determined in the ﬁrst-stage, because it depends on the
stock of information. The higher the information, the lower the asymmetry
in the information, the lower is the value of ®i. The function is stochastic,
because the bank estimates the sensibility of defaults to interest rates shocks
with an error. Since we have to assume that the correlation ½®ri between the
error in the estimate of the sensibility, and the random error in forecasting
default costs is constant, the function ® is linear with respect to the interest
rate factor. In order to apply the function to the entire portfolio of the bank,
we have to derive a similar function deﬁned on the entire portfolio of loans.
We deﬁne Á to be the weighted average of all the single individual functions
®i, with weights given by the ratio hi =
Li
L , that measures the weight of every
single loan with respect to the entire portfolio. (From now on L will repre-
sent the entire portfolio of loans while Li will indicate the single individual





The value of Á increases with ®i, that is a positive function of the interest
rate factor, and the value of the concentration hi. Its value decreases with



















where R = 1 + ri is the interest factor.
It is now possible to summarize the risk factors in an expected default
cost function. We express it as a negative return in per cent terms that
can be simply subtracted from the exogenously given expected returns. In
general this function is given by
D = E[LRp(D)], (17)
where L is the amount of loans of the entire portfolio, p(D) is the subjective
evaluation on part of the banker of probability of default. This equation
simply states that a share p(D) of the loan portfolio will not be repaid.
Considering the fact that in case of default both principal and interest are
not repaid, the expected default cost function is








= L(1 + ri)[
n X
i=1
hi(®i + Ui0 + ¹it)]. (18)
As a consequence, we consider the expected per cent cost of default to be
d = (1 + ri)[
n X
i=1
hi(®i + Ui0 + ¹it)], (19)
with a variance of
¾
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Transaction costs are assumed to be diﬀerent for every security. The term
transaction cost is used in the wide sense and its meaning includes in particu-
lar the cost of the investment in information (search cost, such as advertising,
promotions plus the cost of the evaluation of the reliability of the depositor or
the borrower), zi. The only fundamental assumption, in order to comply with
the requirement of exogenous returns, is that the optimal transaction costs
are proportional to the amount of the security acquired. This assumption is
quite restrictive, since it rules out any economy of scale in the management
of information. The meaning of the assumption and its acceptability varies
considerably with the level of aggregation that we are considering. In the
case of a widely diversiﬁed portfolio of assets, it means that the cost of the
optimal information for a loan of a dollar and for a loan of a million dollar is
the same ﬁxed proportion of the loan, even if it is issued to the same person.
And this seems hardly acceptable. But if we assume that every asset rep-
resents a particular contract issued to a selected set of customers pooled on
the basis of some common characteristic, the story seems more reasonable.
What we are now assuming is that, on average, the bank estimates the cost
of information for that kind of loans, to be a ﬁxed percentage of the loans.
From another perspective the model allows us to take into account the
existence of economies of scope. Economies of scope would cause transaction
costs of diﬀerent assets to be correlated with each other. There might be
two relevant sets of economies of scope: economies in acquisition of the in-
formation regarding the quality of loans, that would determine a correlation
between certain categories of assets; and economies between some sets of
assets and some sets of securities, as for example loans and deposits of ﬁrms.
2.3 Expected net returns and variance
We are now able to show expected net returns of the securities and their
respective variance. Throughout this work we assume that ﬁnancial markets
are highly competitive and banks behave competitively in order to attract
households deposits and to provide loans. Accordingly banks are considered
to be price takers. This implies that they can choose the quantity of the
liability that these services represent in their balance sheet, at a given cost,
which is represented by the market interest rate plus a transaction cost. The
expected return (cost) of any liability is composed of two terms, the interest
12rate component and the transaction cost component:
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Transaction costs are assumed to be forecasted with an error, in order to
capture the eﬀect of technological shocks that aﬀect the ﬁnancial markets.










The return on the asset represented by loans has three components, a posi-
tive component represented by the expected interest rate earned, minus the
transaction cost expressed in percent terms, and minus the default cost of
the loan. Formally 5
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n X
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hi(Ui0 + ¹it)] + 2½cb®¾cb¾® + 2½i®¾i¾®. (30)
5As in Kane and Malkiel [15].
13It is important to remark that the degree of concentration is exogenously
given for every class of security. That degree is the outcome of a prior choice
of a standard composition for every class of securities. Every class is formally
analogous to a mutual fund, whose degree of diversiﬁcation depends on the
peculiarities of the securities that compose it. For example we might assume
a higher degree of diversiﬁcation in the case of consumer credit than in the
case of loans issued to ﬁrms.
2.4 The portfolio model
In order to evaluate how the introduction of a common monetary area aﬀects
the portfolio of banking intermediaries we concentrate our attention on the
asset side of the portfolio, assuming the existence of a standard liability,
deposits. The bank can choose among state bonds that we call gilts, and
three assets issued to private ﬁrms: bonds, normal loans and commitment
loans. Bonds are divided in two categories, high rating and junk bonds.
We assume the existence of two intermediaries that face the identical
problem in two diﬀerent states. Every bank can purchase gilts and bonds
issued by any of the two countries, while it can issue loans only to ﬁrms of
its own country. We assume that gilts have no default or transaction costs,
while bonds have default cost but no transaction costs. Transaction costs on
bonds are assumed to be the same in both countries, because the common
market for ﬁnancial services was fully developed long before the introduction
of the common currency. The balance sheet of the bank operating in one of
the two countries (France and Italy) includes on the asset side: gilts issued
by the Italian State, gilts issued by the French State, bonds issued by French
ﬁrms, bonds issued by Italian ﬁrms, loans and commitment loans issued in
the home country.
Bonds could be both high risk and high yield junk bonds, or very safe
assets issued by large corporations with high credit ratings; the assumption
that we make is that the correlation between returns and default costs is
higher in the case of bonds than in the case of loans. Loans have a lower
correlation because the investment in internal information reduces the impact
of the asymmetry of the information. It is important to consider that banks
should not be willing to buy bonds more risky than the loans they can issue,
because junk bonds would normally be dominated by loans. The interest
premium on junk bonds is a market price for the risk of the borrower and
it is strictly dependent on the information available to the market. But
14banks can rely on a more detailed set of information, based on ”internal
information”, using Fama’s [5] terminology. Since they are better informed
than the market, they choose to issue loans to a particular borrower only if
they can obtain a higher return than that on the corresponding bond, if they
consider the risk to be correctly priced by the market. Or otherwise they
lend at the same interest rate, if they consider that the market overvalues
the risk of the borrower. In both cases their superior information set allows
banks to obtain better conditions than the market. As a consequence, junk
bonds should always be dominated by loans.
This result is produced by the current and past investment in information,
because if this was not the case, banking institutions could not survive in
the market. We can therefore assume that the relevant alternative for the
portfolio choice of a bank is normally represented by bonds with a lower
risk and return that are a good substitute for gilts. But many European
banks might have not invested heavily in information in the past, because
the market was highly regulated, and most banks in many countries were
state-owned. For these banks the cost of the current investment necessary
to undertake the evaluation of the borrowers would be too high, and would
oﬀset, in the current period, the beneﬁts given by the internal information.
These banks could have an incentive to hold some junk bonds, in order to
diversify their portfolio of assets with a high return. Therefore we assume
the existence of two classes of banks: ”good” banks that normally do not
hold junk bonds, and ”bad” banks that hold junk bonds because they have
not invested in the past.
Commitment loans are the class of loans for which information problems
of the bank are less severe and they are normally issued to the best and most
reliable clients. Accordingly it seems natural to assume that the adverse
selection and moral hazard problem as interest rates rise are less severe for
this class of borrowers. The expected return on commitment loans has to
be lower than on normal loans, because they are less risky. If this was not
the case, then they would have both a higher return and a lower variance,
dominating the other class of loans and the bank would never choose to hold
normal loans in its portfolio. Since there is no reason to assume default
cost or transaction costs to be higher for the most reliable class of borrowers
(they will most likely be lower), the mark-up must be substantially lower. In
other words, competition in the credit market would transmit the beneﬁts
of the increased information to the borrowers in terms of a lower interest
rate on loans. The lower mark-up implies that an increase in the common
15interest rate factor causes a lower increase of the rate of this class than of
the rate of normal loans. Besides, the maturity of commitment loans is
spanned over a longer period of time than that of normal loans. Both these
factors imply that, issuing commitment loans rather than normal loans, the
bank undertakes a higher degree of smoothing of the shocks that aﬀect their
borrowers.
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We can now deﬁne the matrix of variance and covariance, assuming the
following:
The costs of diﬀerent types of loans are positively correlated with each
other.
Interest rates are positively correlated with default costs.6
The correlation between interest rates and costs of loans is higher for
junk bonds rather than normal bonds. It is higher for bonds rather than
loans, and for normal loans rather than commitment loans. Formally,
½djrj > ½dbrb > ½dlrl > ½dcrc. (31)
The variance of the returns on normal loans is higher than that of
commitment loans. The variance of the returns on bonds is even lower,
the variance of the returns on junk bonds is higher than the variance
of the return on loans. The expected returns on commitment loans are
lower than on normal loans. The expected returns of bonds are even
6As in Jaﬀee and Russell [14], or Stiglitz and Weiss [21].
16lower than the expected returns on commitment loans, the expected


















Gilts have lower return and lower variance than any other asset.
All the shocks are independent white noise.
The value of the function ®i that shows the sensibility of default cost
to interest rate is higher for bonds than for loans and for normal loans
rather than commitment loans. The reason is that the value of the
coeﬃcient ®i is a function of the available information;
®b > ®l > ®c. (33)
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For simplicity we will rule out the eﬀects of the correlation among assets and
deposits.
All the covariances are the same as in the following example, concerning
the covariance between loans and commitment loans:
¾lc = ½lc¾l¾c; (36)
the correlation terms of the covariances can be expressed, as
½lc = ½dldc + ½dlrc + ½dcrl + ½clcc + ½rlrc. (37)
The matrix has zeros only in the row and the column of the liability, and we
will not show it because it is not particularly illuminating.
172.5 The eﬀect of shocks
When the banking system is the main source of ﬁnance for ﬁrms, the activity
of banks is centered on the issuance of diﬀerent kinds of loans, through the
analysis of information regarding diﬀerent borrowers and the quality of their
projects. The entrepreneurial activity of the bank consists of the screening
and selection of diﬀerent projects on the basis of the evaluations of expected
returns and risks that the available information permits. When a shock hits
the economy, the impact is lower on information intense assets, such as loans,
than on bonds priced in the market. And the bank is often willing to absorb
part of the negative impact of the shock on ﬁrms, in order to preserve the
value of the stock of information.
Traditional banking activity reduces the impact of shocks in two diﬀerent
ways. When a ﬁrm defaults on its debt, while a default on bonds triggers
liquidation almost immediately, banks are more willing to renegotiate the
terms of their loans. The superior information set that bank possess allows
them to price the risk better than the market. In second place, banks can
often be willing to smooth the impact of shocks on debtors. In this case
they refrain from increasing the interest rate in proportion with the increase
in the cost of their liabilities (in the case of an interest rate shock) or in
proportion with the increase of default costs (in the case of a credit quality
shock). Banks compensate the reduced income when the negative shock
hits the economy with an opposite behavior when a positive shock favors
the debtor. In this way they can obtain higher average returns and lower
volatility of their returns. This behavior is favored by the possession of
market power, otherwise ﬁrms could choose to borrow from a competitor in
good periods, and the development of this kind of implicit contract could
only be the outcome of the establishment of a strong long-term relationship.
The insurance provided by the credit system is very important for ﬁrms,
but the cost that ﬁrms pay for this service is high. Banks in fact exploit
their market power in order to maximize their proﬁts. The spread between
the rate on their liabilities and the rate on their assets can be very high and
represents a heavy burden for liquidity constrained ﬁrms. The development
of a large market for bonds changes the picture completely. Firms that are
large enough to sustain the transaction costs (that include in particular the
cost of conveying the relevant information to the market) can get access to
the bond market. Banks that are willing to lend to large corporations have
to oﬀer them terms and conditions competitive with the bond market. On
18the other hand, banks can still exploit their market power, charging higher
rates to small ﬁrms.7
2.5.1 A monetary shock
We will ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of a perfectly anticipated monetary policy
shock that aﬀects positively all the returns, applying parts 1) and 3) of the
theorem of section (2.1). Under our assumptions, the variation of interest
rates per se, being proportional to each security, leaves the portfolio problem
unchanged. But because of asymmetric information, default costs increase
as the interest rates rise, partially oﬀsetting the positive eﬀect on the rates.
8 The key point to note is that default costs do not increase symmetrically,
because commitment loans are extended exclusively to the best customers.
As customers are screened and divided into two classes, the problems of
asymmetric information aﬀect normal loans to a much higher degree than
commitment loans, causing the higher correlation among interest rates and
costs of normal loans. The correlation is even higher in the case of bonds,
and this is true for any category of bonds, because it is the investment in
information that reduces the correlation. Since junk bonds are more risky
than normal bonds, we can assume that the correlation is lower in the case
of normal bonds than in the case of junk bonds.
The interest rate shock in itself increases proportionately the variance of
diﬀerent assets, shown in equation (34). But the eﬀect of the correlation
between interest rates and default costs clearly causes an asymmetric impact
on diﬀerent classes of assets. This implies a proportional shift of the optimal
portfolio from bonds to loans and from loans to gilts. Since the eﬀect is
stronger for normal loans, the contraction is not proportional: the quantity
of normal loans held will be reduced more than the quantity of commitment
loans, the holding of bonds will be shrieked even more. The conclusion seems
inescapable: the increase of interest rate will shift the portfolio of the bank.
The bank will substitute gilts for loans, commitment loans for normal loans
and loans in general for bonds. 9 As the shock hits the economy, banks
7Empirical works show that in general banks beneﬁt from market power in the market
for loans, see for example Cosimano [4]
8When interest rates are suﬃciently high and the increase in interest rates is of signiﬁ-
cant magnitude, the eﬀect on default costs might overcome the eﬀect on rates, as Stiglitz
pointed out on many occasions. But we consider the ”normal” case here.
9Berlin and Mester [2] provided some evidence in favor of the hypothesis of intertem-
19tends to hold more state bonds rather than private sector assets. At the
same time there is a tendency for the relationship between ﬁrms and banks
to strengthen, banks reduce their holdings of bonds in favor of loans, and
increase in particular the amount of commitment loans they hold.
We have assumed for simplicity that the increase in interest rates is sym-
metrical. If we relax this assumption, the results hold a fortiori. Competition
in the credit sector is much weaker than in the stock market, where bonds
are traded, because of the importance of inside information. Banks charge a
mark up to their borrowers, but implicitly provide an insurance, not raising
the rates proportionately when they go up, and not reducing them propor-
tionately when they go down.10 The most reliable customers beneﬁt from a
lower mark up, as a consequence the impact of the rise of the rate would be
lower on the rates of commitment loans.
When interest rates go up, banks have a beneﬁt because the returns on
their assets grow, while ﬁrms are negatively aﬀected by the higher cost of
ﬁnance. The negative impact on ﬁrms is transmitted to banks as an increase
in default costs. Using their superior information set, banks can reduce the
negative indirect impact of the higher rates, providing insurance to ﬁrms.
Spanning the increase of the rates over a longer period of time, banks provide
a useful service to ﬁrms, because they smooth intertemporally the impact of
shocks. As a compensation for the service provided they get higher average
returns on their assets. Since most of the increase in the returns comes from
a reduction of default costs, banks can provide this form of insurance because
they can exploit the information in their posses, selecting the ﬁrms to which
is proﬁtable to provide insurance. The market cannot provide this service
because it does not possess the necessary information to reduce the impact
of the asymmetry of the information discriminating among ﬁrms.
2.5.2 A real shock
A negative real shock that hits the borrowers aﬀects the cost structure of
the bank in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst and most obvious eﬀect is an
poral smoothing through the exploitation of long term relationships. According to their
results ”in general loan rate smoothing in response to a credit risk shock is not part of an
optimal long term contract between a bank and its borrower, while loan rate smoothing in
response to an interest-rate shock is”. For a credit risk shock, only for the smallest subset
of banks could a signiﬁcant positive relation be found.
10See Fried and Howitt [6].
20increase of the probability of default that reduces the expected return on
loans. This time there is no reason to believe that the shock hits diﬀerent
categories of assets in a diﬀerent way. As the shock hits the economy, all
classes of debtors are aﬀected, and costs are expected to increase in the same
proportion. The higher correlation between default costs and interest rates of
normal loans determines a tendency for a more than proportional reduction
of the holding of normal loans rather than commitment loans. But this time
the eﬀect is much smaller than in the case of a monetary shock, because the
asymmetry aﬀects only the covariance terms of all the components of the
variance of each asset. Accordingly, the ﬁrst order eﬀect is for the bank to
reduce proportionately the holdings of both types of assets, as the appeal of
safe bonds increases. The substitution between the two kinds of liabilities
depends this time on a second order eﬀect and in many instances it may
turn out to be insigniﬁcant. Its importance depends on the segmentation
of the market between the two categories of loans and it is likely to be
signiﬁcant only in the case of a very high correlation between the idiosyncratic
component of the return and the default cost for normal loans and a very
low one in the case of commitment loans.
The shock produces at the same time a strong eﬀect on the demand for
ﬁnance. A negative shock reduces the cash ﬂow of ﬁrms and has a negative
impact on their credit rating, as a consequence ﬁrms ﬁnd increasingly diﬃcult
to obtain ﬁnance in the stock market. The demand for loans goes up and
the higher demand produces an increase of the expected return on loans.
Because of the higher expected return the bank might be willing to increase
the share of loans in its portfolio.
The ﬁnal eﬀect on the composition of the portfolio depends on the relative
strength of the two opposite eﬀects of the shock on returns and variance of
loans. If the negative eﬀect on the return on loans due to the increase in
default costs prevails, the bank will tend to increase the quantity held of
safe assets, such as gilts or high rated bonds. If on the contrary the positive
eﬀect on the return of loans prevails (as it is the case when competition in the
banking sector is limited), banks would beneﬁt from the higher rates charged
to borrowers, in order to exploit as much as possible their market power.
It is important to observe that under both scenarios the impact on ﬁrms
would be negative. The choice to hold gilts and other safe bonds in the
portfolio would reduce the supply of funds in the market, increasing the cost
of ﬁnance in the moment when ﬁrms are cash-constrained. In the alternative
scenario, banks would actually increase their loans, but because they can
21exploit their market power, they raise the cost of ﬁnance for ﬁrms.
We have previously shown that when an interest rate shock hits the econ-
omy, banks might be willing to smooth the shock, because they have a su-
perior information set regarding their customers, and they can price better
than the market the diﬀerent impact of the increase in the risk of default.
Better information allows banks to concentrate the portfolio on borrowers
that are aﬀected less by the shock; the ﬂight to quality brings banks in closer
relationship with the best customers. When a negative real shock hits the
economy, diﬀerent ﬁrms are aﬀected in diﬀerent ways, and even in the case
of the worse shocks, some industrial sectors might beneﬁt when most of the
others lose. The impact is diﬀerent among diﬀerent ﬁrms, among diﬀerent
industrial sectors and among diﬀerent economic regions. On the contrary,
there is no reason to believe that diﬀerent categories of assets of the bank
are aﬀected diﬀerently. The reason is that banks cannot forecast the shock
better than the market and they cannot price ex ante the eventuality of the
shock, nor, even more importantly, the distributive eﬀects of the shock. Af-
ter the shock, some of the borrowers have been aﬀected more, some other
less. Many ﬁrms are liquidity constrained and their risk of default has gone
up. In this situation the market for bonds dries up, because the higher un-
certainty makes it very diﬃcult for the market to price properly the risk,
because a large scale lemon problem emerges. Banks possess internal infor-
mation that allows them to partially overcome the lemon problem and have
invested heavily in the past to build the relationships, so they are reluctant
to cut the credit to their long term borrowers. For this reason, in general
they might be more willing to absorb the shock than the market. But at the
same time, their market power is increased notably, because the demand for
ﬁnance is higher and the supply of bonds, the main substitutes of banking
facilities, is drastically reduced. So banks face a strong incentive to exploit
the market power, charging a higher price for the smoothing of the shock.
Since the impact of a real shock is very diﬀerent among diﬀerent borrowers,
it is very diﬀerent among banks too. And geographical diﬀerentiation plays a
key role. Small local banks often have a portfolio whose risk is concentrated
on a few industrial sectors; these banks can be more willing to smooth the
real shock, because if the shock hits many of their customers, they have no
one else to lend to. They will charge ﬁrms for the insurance they provide,
increasing the average cost of ﬁnance over a long period of time, but they
can’t exploit their market power in full. Banks whose portfolio is suﬃciently
diversiﬁed can be willing to use the information they posses in order to ex-
22ploit their market power. In this case, they still smooth the shock, because
in the absence of banks, credit would be rationed, but they charge a higher
fee for the insurance provided.
In general, when an interest rate shock hits the economy, banks bene-
ﬁt from the shock and they have an incentive to provide insurance to ﬁrms
against the shock, using the information that they posses (that is not avail-
able to the market) to select the customers to insure. When a real shock
hits the economy both ﬁrms and banks are negatively aﬀected. But since
the business of banks is more diversiﬁed they are less risky than the average
of industrial ﬁrms. Under these conditions, poorly diversiﬁed banks have
an incentive to use the information at their disposal to provide insurance;
better-diversiﬁed banks ﬁnd more proﬁtable to use the information to in-
crease the eﬃciency in the allocation of capital. Larger banks might choose
to create an internal capital market in order to exploit the continuous varia-
tions of the risk-return proﬁle of assets of diﬀerent regions.11 Since the shock
at the same time increases the demand for ﬁnance and reduces the avail-
ability of substitutes for banking services, the role of banks become crucial
under these conditions. The available information allows banks to gain from
arbitrages that are normally conducted by the market, and to exploit their
market power lending to high-risk customers at very high rates. Diversiﬁca-
tion gives banks a wider set of opportunities, increasing the market price of
the liquidity they provide.
The empirical results of Berlin and Mester [2] and [3] conﬁrm these conclu-
sions, showing that apparently only local banks tend to smooth real shocks.
2.6 Geographical diversiﬁcation
The range of diversiﬁcation of the portfolio is determined a priori by the
relevant set of assets and liabilities. But the availability of a wide range
of securities depends crucially on the technology to obtain and process the
information and on the stock of information accumulated in the past. If
relevant economies of scale are present in the information technology, large
banks might have a competitive advantage in relation to the small ones.
The technology would in this case grant the availability of a higher degree
of diversiﬁcation. In this framework, the dimension is relevant only to the
11Houston and James [7] showed that this is an empirically relevant phenomenon in the
US.
23extent that large banks have exclusive access to certain assets (as loans to
large corporations) that are precluded to the small ones. But a local bank
that has developed across time a strong network of personal relationships
can issue loans with a risk-return proﬁle that is not always available to the
large one. Large banks have a competitive advantage only if they are highly
capitalized and at the same time they have invested heavily in the past to
establish personal relationships at the local level. And it might be possible
for diseconomies of scale to emerge in the management of the available infor-
mation. (It can be very diﬃcult for employees of large banking corporations,
that are part of a bureaucratic system, to develop the mental attitude and
the skills of the entrepreneur of a local bank.)
The crucial aspect of the problem is represented by the availability of
alternative assets that are poorly correlated among each other. From this
point of view a major factor seems to be represented by the range of possible
geographical diversiﬁcation. Diﬀerent regions are in general characterized,
both in Europe and in the US, by diﬀerent productive structure and diﬀerent
business cycles. The extent of the possible diversiﬁcation might crucially
depend on the extent of the regulatory barriers that are imposed to the
location of credit intermediaries. The empirical evidence available, as in
Hughes et alia [9], shows that a larger geographical diversiﬁcation improves
expected returns and eﬃciency, without reducing the insolvency risk of banks.
The availability of a wider range of risk-return combinations, while certainly
beneﬁcial for the bank, does not necessarily imply a reduction of the risk
undertaken, as the authors stress. The equilibrium in the new possibility
frontier might in fact involve higher expected returns and higher variance,
the ﬁnal outcome being dependent on the structure of preferences.
3 The bank’s risk attitude and the EMU
In continental Europe the importance of the stock markets as a source of
ﬁnance for ﬁrms was relatively modest until the end of the eighties. The
market for bonds issued by private ﬁrms was almost non-existent, and most
ﬁrms were entirely dependent on banks to ﬁnance their investments. The
only ﬁnancial markets that were on a par with their American counterparts
were the national markets for state bonds that had grown in order to ﬁnance
the large debts accumulated by all European states. In many countries, a
large number of industrial ﬁrms and banks were still owned by the state,
24directly or indirectly.
The following decade has produced a revolution that has permanently
transformed the industrial structures of most European countries, and rad-
ically changed their ﬁnancial markets. The ﬁrst major innovation was the
reduction of the structural deﬁcit and the stabilization of public debts, fol-
lowing the adoption of the Maastricht treaty and of the stability pact. After
the major convulsions of 1992 and 1993 the markets for state bonds have seen
a progressive stabilization, as the risk proﬁle of most European countries has
improved, and as a consequence of the process of convergence towards the
monetary union.
The large programs of privatization undertaken have increased enormously
the importance of stock markets, as they have attracted savers that were pre-
viously reluctant to invest in the stock market. The privatization of large
industrial and banking ﬁrms has pushed the ﬁnancial markets of the con-
tinent to adopt an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, with the
introduction of public companies whose shares are owned by a large number
of investors. Overall the passage of the control of large sectors of the econ-
omy from the state to the private sector has increased the eﬃciency of the
system, but it has increased as well the sensitivity of the economy to shocks,
increasing, on average, the volatility of ﬁnancial assets.
The introduction of the euro has pushed forward the development of
a common European market for capital, thereby improving the allocation
of capital. One of the main achievements has been the development of a
eurobond market that is comparable with the market of the US. The de-
velopment of a market for commercial paper denominated in euro has been
a major change, since it has for the ﬁrst time broken the dependence of
European ﬁrms from banks. Firms can now choose among a large set of
securities, such as shares, bonds and convertibles that compete with loans
issued by banks. Banks on the other hand are now freer from political pres-
sures, they can refuse the granting of loans to public and semi-public ﬁrms
and can allocate capital eﬃciently. Traditional banking activity suﬀers from
the competition of stock and bond markets, but at the same time banks get
a larger share of their proﬁts from the commissions earned through primary
placements. The development of capital markets has allowed banks to resell
many of the risks they undertake by means of securitization and the huge
development of this market has represented another major change.
The introduction of the common currency has been the last step of this
long process. The actual introduction of the euro and the establishment of
25the ECB have brought some further changes in ﬁnancial markets. The aboli-
tion of exchange rates has harmonized diﬀerent national markets, establishing
de facto the common market, because the country-speciﬁc risk has virtually
disappeared in the twelve members of the EU. Besides European ﬁnancial
markets are now subject to the same monetary policy shocks, and the syn-
chronization of the business cycles of most countries has increased in the last
decade.
Some of the members of the Union have diﬀerent economic structures
among regions and relevant problems of regional asymmetries in economic
development. Italy, Spain and Germany all have their own ”mezzogiorno”.12
The virtual absence of ﬂexibility in the wage structure and the reduced mobil-
ity of labor determine structural unemployment and the output gap. Imper-
fections in credit markets exacerbate the problems, reducing the availability
of ﬁnance in underdeveloped regions and the risk-taking activity on the part
of the banking system that normally shares the burden caused by adverse
shocks to the economic system.
The development of a eurobond market competitive with the market of
the US has increased the availability of ﬁnance for European ﬁrms. The
establishment of the single currency has drastically accelerated the devel-
opment of the European ﬁnancial markets, reducing the dependence of the
industrial system on the banking system. At the same time it has increased
the range of assets available for both savers and intermediaries, increasing
the possibilities of risk diversiﬁcation. One of the major outcomes of the
development of ﬁnancial markets in the common currency area was the cre-
ation of a common market for risk, allowing the market to pool risks among
diﬀerent countries and increasing interregional risk sharing.13
3.1 Eﬀects of the common currency on the portfolio
3.1.1 State bonds and private sector securities
The eﬀect of the common currency on relative returns and volatility of gilts
issued by diﬀerent members of the Union is uncertain. The Maastricht treaty
has produced a reduction of returns and variance on bonds issued by countries
with a larger burden of debt. The treaty has not probably aﬀected the cost of
12For an early diagnosis of the problems of German reuniﬁcation see Hughes Hallett and
M´ elitz [11] and Hughes Hallett and Ma [10].
13See M´ elitz and Zumer [19]
26the debt of the other countries much. Assuming that risk is eﬃciently priced
in the bond market, the joint reduction of returns and variance should have
not moved the eﬃcient frontier in a relevant way.
The main eﬀect of the introduction of a common currency has been a
strong increase of the correlation among diﬀerent gilts that are now denom-
inated in the same currency. Interest rates are now inﬂuenced by a common
monetary policy, bonds issued by diﬀerent member states are now subject
to a common shock. Fiscal policy constraints determined by Maastricht cri-
teria and the stability pact have led to a further convergence of rates and
risk proﬁle, increasing the correlation even further. As a consequence, the
idiosyncratic components of the interest rate on diﬀerent gilts have converged
too. The increase of the correlation among gilts has strongly increased their
covariance, as beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation are drastically reduced. But at
the same time the reduction of the standard deviation of every security has
worked in the opposite direction. In our model, gilts issued by the French
and Italian state, that were held in diﬀerent proportions as separate compo-
nents of the portfolio, are now virtually the same. Since returns and variance
have converged, and the covariance has been aﬀected in opposite directions,
it is not possible to establish if the two separate state gilts had previously a
larger or smaller share of the portfolio than they have now that they behave
as a virtually identical asset.
The establishment of a common currency has had a diﬀerent impact on
private assets. Risk and return of loans and commitment loans are not di-
rectly aﬀected by the disappearance of the exchange rate. The correlation
among private sector assets has increased, but much less than in the case of
state bonds. The increase in the correlation was entirely dependent on the
disappearance of the exchange rate risk and the establishment of the com-
mon monetary policy. But in the case of the return of private assets, the
idiosyncratic component is the most relevant, and it has not been aﬀected
in a uniform way. Besides, returns of market assets depend on default and
transaction costs as well as on interest rates. Default costs are not likely to
have been aﬀected directly by the establishment of the common currency.
Transaction costs might have been aﬀected, because in the bond market
some economies of scale might have been achieved with the introduction of
the common currency. But this eﬀect would have been an increase of the net
return of all diﬀerent classes of bonds, including state bonds.
In conclusion, it is not clear if and how the introduction of the euro per se
has aﬀected the distribution of the portfolio of banks between private sector
27and state assets.
3.1.2 Bond markets and risk intermediation
Bonds issued by corporations can be both assets with a lower risk and lower
return than loans (as in the case of most bonds issued by ﬁrms that have
an investment grade rating) or with higher risk and return (such as junk
bonds). The development of a large market for bonds issued by private ﬁrms
has allowed the possibility of diversiﬁcation among diﬀerent assets issued
by the private sector. The reduction of the covariance among these assets
due to the increase in diversiﬁcation causes a shift of the portfolio of banking
intermediaries, in favor of private sector assets. But at the same time another
factor works in the opposite direction: some bank customers can now issue
junk bonds, reducing the demand (and the returns) of loans. The lower
returns on loans increase the appeal of state gilts.
The availability of a wide range of bond gives ﬁrms a wider range of op-
tions to ﬁnance their investments, reducing the market power of banks. At
the same time bonds provide banks, even small local banks, with the oppor-
tunity to diversify part of their asset portfolio, reducing their dependence on
the traditional activity of issuing loans. This factor might reduce the willing-
ness of banks to rely on the traditional activity, reducing the availability of
ﬁnance for small ﬁrms that do not have access to ﬁnancial markets. ”Good”
banks should only hold high rating bonds in their portfolio, as a substitute for
gilts. But in the European banking sector ”bad” banks had a relevant share
of the market, because in many countries the banking sector was directly or
indirectly under the control of the state until very recently (in Germany this
is true even today). Overall many European banks might have decided to
hold bonds in their portfolio of assets. Apparently this should not change
the risk-taking activity of the banking sector, since holding bonds they still
ﬁnance the private sector. But there is a crucial diﬀerence: when the bank
keeps bonds in its portfolio, the risk is simply transferred from the share-
holders of the ﬁrm to shareholders and depositors of the bank. When the
bank issues loans to the private sector, it reduces the overall risk, because
its entrepreneurial activity, the analysis of information, contributes to the
selection of the best projects.
This tendency for a reduction in direct risk-taking activity on part of
banks might have been more than compensated by the great development of
the market for securitization that has occurred in recent years. Santomero
28and Trester [20] have proved that ”the risky asset portfolio held by the bank-
ing sector unambiguously increases as a result of the innovation considered.”
Their model shows that securitization allows banks to face better any even-
tual liquidity shock, so they can take more risky positions. The development
of a market for securitized assets has pushed the banking system to take
more risk.
The wider range of available alternatives for investment is likely to have
increased the share of private assets in the portfolio of banks. The devel-
opment of a market for bonds issued by private corporations has widely
increased the range of ﬁnancial instruments available. The process of pri-
vatization and deregulation has increased the eﬃciency and the risk-taking
activity of large sectors of the economy that were previously under the con-
trol of the state. Besides, the development of a European market has allowed
the exploitation of large economies of scale in many sectors producing many
new opportunities for investment. 14 The wider range of activities due to the
development of new industrial sectors, increases the possibilities of diversiﬁ-
cation. The increased diversiﬁcation reduces the covariance among securities
issued by the private sector, reducing the variance of classes of private assets,
such as loans and bonds. A straightforward application of the comparative-
static theorem developed in the previous chapter shows that the portfolio
of banks should have substituted private sector assets for state bonds. The
development of securitization has reinforced the process,15 pushing banks
to increase their risk-taking activity. As a consequence, the credit system
should have undertaken a larger share of the risk of the private sector.
3.2 Shocks, portfolio allocation and the euro
3.2.1 Monetary policy shocks
Interest rate shocks change the optimal composition of the portfolio of ﬁnan-
cial operators, pushing the bank toward relationship lending, strengthening
the link with the ﬁrms. This kind of reaction has been strengthened by the
establishment of the common currency. Diﬀerent European countries are
now subject to a common shock, and ﬁnancial intermediaries cannot reduce
their exposure by means of geographical diversiﬁcation. The disappearance
14The debt of some European telecommunication companies is today of a size compa-
rable to that of the small states members of the Union.
15As the model of Santomero and Trester shows.
29of exchange rates and the establishment of a common monetary policy have
reduced in a relevant way the possibilities of diversiﬁcation among all kinds
of assets traded in ﬁnancial markets, bonds, gilts, stocks or other securities.
In the new monetary regime, the correlation of the interest rate component
of the returns of all diﬀerent securities has increased, reducing the possibility
of washing away the risk trough diversiﬁcation.
The concomitant development of the market for bonds and other secu-
rities, such as securitized loans, has not reduced the impact of interest rate
shocks, because bonds are more subject to this kind of risk than loans. Banks
can reduce the impact of interest rate shocks on default costs and on the vari-
ance of their portfolio only relying on informational intensive assets such as
loans and especially commitment loans. After the introduction of the euro,
intertemporal diversiﬁcation has become more appealing. Because of the
reduced possibility of geographical diversiﬁcation, beneﬁts associated with
relationship lending, that bring about a reduction of the variance of the
portfolio, have become more valuable. For example, the debt of ﬁrms op-
erating in the telecommunication sector is now subject to the same interest
rate shock. Banks cannot reduce much the risk of the shock diversifying their
loans among diﬀerent European operators. An increase in the rates due to a
tougher monetary policy of the ECB would push banks toward loans, reduc-
ing the bond component of their portfolio. Italian banks would increase their
loans to the Telecom Italia and French banks to France Telecom, reducing
their holding of bonds of other operators, because by issuing loans they could
monitor the debt from inside.16
The shift of the portfolio of the bank toward loans aﬀects in a relevant way
the risk attitude of the bank. The introduction of the euro has reduced the
trade-oﬀ between the two kinds of diversiﬁcation and banks are, according
to the model, more willing to absorb shocks. Banks have to rely more on
intertemporal diversiﬁcation, and are more willing to smooth an interest rate
shock in order to reduce the volatility of their portfolio.
The important conclusion is that asymmetries in the eﬀects of monetary
policy are reduced by the operation of the banking system.17 The stronger
the shock, the stronger the incentive for banks to rely on traditional activ-
16In the model we have assumed that banks can issue loans only in their home country,
but a bank operating across diﬀerent countries would not be less exposed to interest rate
shocks, because the shock is common.
17The problems of asymmetries in monetary policy are discussed in Hughes Hallett and
Piscitelli [12]
30ity where smoothing of the shock is part of the optimal (implicit) contract.
Besides, the stronger is the adverse eﬀect of the shock on ﬁrms, the stronger
becomes the incentive for banks to rely on information-intense banking ac-
tivity. The introduction of the common currency has reinforced this eﬀect.
The increase shock absorption of the ﬁnancial system mitigates the impact
of the interest rate shock, reducing the eventual asymmetry of the eﬀects of
monetary policy.
3.2.2 Real shocks
Real shocks change relative prices causing the default of some of the ﬁrms
that are negatively aﬀected. Creditors of these ﬁrms suﬀer a credit quality
shock; the returns of the banks that are exposed are reduced and the risk of
their portfolio is increased at the same time. The main factors determining
the shocks are technological developments, changes in tastes and preferences
of individuals and variations in the availability of resources. In general,
these factors do not seem to be aﬀected in a straightforward way by the
introduction of the common currency. The eﬀect of the common currency on
the symmetry of real shocks is an empirical issue that is quite open.
The main route for banks to reduce the impact of real shocks on their
balance sheet is geographical diversiﬁcation. Diﬀerent economic regions have
diﬀerent productive structures and the same shock aﬀects diﬀerent ﬁrms in
a diﬀerent way. The lower the correlation of the impact of the shock on
diﬀerent regions, the higher the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation. Our portfolio
model showed that diversiﬁcation increases the value of the market power,
produced the monopoly that banks have on internal information. The higher
the diversiﬁcation and the market power of banks, the higher the cost for
ﬁrms of the insurance provided against the shock. The introduction of the
euro has pushed forward the consolidation in the credit market, as national
central banks have been in favor of the creation of national champions. Many
regional banks have disappeared and the market share of local banks has
declined. The reduction of the market share of local and regional banks has
increased the cost for ﬁrms of the intertemporal smoothing of shocks.
The development of the eurobond market has produced an increase in
the availability and a reduction in the cost of ﬁnance for ﬁrms. But when
a negative shock hits the economy, a large-scale lemon problem aﬀects the
market for bonds, and ﬁrms have to rely on banks in order to obtain liquidity.
As a consequence, the negative impact of the shock is not mitigated by the
31existence of the bond market. And the banking system would not tend to
reduce the asymmetry of the impact of real shocks hitting the economy,
because highly diversiﬁed banks smooth unevenly. The existence of a large
market for securitized loans reinforces the process further on. Santomero and
Trester showed in fact that the increase of the risk of the portfolio brought
about by the availability of securitization makes banks more vulnerable to
instability and default. 18 The increased sensitivity to default cost makes
bank less willing to absorb shocks.
With the exception of small local banks, the banking system tends in
general to amplify the asymmetric eﬀect of real shocks. The main conclusion
of this section is that the transformation of the ﬁnancial sector brought about
by the introduction of the common currency has worsened the problem. The
process of privatization have increased the eﬃciency of the economic system,
but it has at the same time increased the sensitivity of the economy to
shocks. The development of securitization and of the bond market have
increased the risk-taking of banks and reduced their margins in lending to
large ﬁrms. Finally, the consolidation in the banking sector has reduced the
role of regional banks and the relevance of the implicit insurance that they
provide to ﬁrms.
3.2.3 A common market for banking activities?
The institutional framework plays a crucial role in this story. The Maastricht
treaty has left the regulation of the banking system to national central banks
that have been particularly concerned with the protection of the national
ownership of banks, and have restrained the access of foreign banks. The
introduction of a common market for banking activities would have a strong
impact. The segmentation of European national credit systems makes banks
18”The results suggests that the risky asset portfolio held by the banking sector un-
ambiguously increases as a result of the innovation considered. A reduction in illiquidity
increases the banking sector’s willingness to provide risk capital for real sector investment.
On the other hand, the existence of a market for bank loans does not in and of itself
imply that banks will become more or less risky. Rather, there exists a trade-oﬀ between
external shock risk, which is alleviated by increased asset liquidity, and the risk-taking
by banks on the returns of their assets, which is encouraged by these market changes.
Such innovation encourages credit risk-taking and increases insolvency risk ...On the one
hand, banks are providing increased resources for the development of real sector capital as
a result of these changes. On the other hand, they are doing so by adding risk of default
to their portfolio.”, Santomero and Trester [20], p. 36.
32heavily subject to macroeconomic shocks at the national level. If banks could
diversify to a large extent their loans portfolio among diﬀerent European
states (or among diﬀerent European regions), the increased diversiﬁcation
of their portfolio would improve the stability of the credit system and the
competition among large banks could be drastically increased.
Banks tend to smooth interest rate shocks. Under a more geographically
integrated banking system, interest rate shocks would still be absorbed, as the
incentives to smooth the shocks remains strong. The possibility of a larger
diversiﬁcation of loans reduces by itself the covariance among the assets in the
portfolio, reducing the risk of default of loans. But interest rate risk cannot
be completely washed away by diversiﬁcation, because the shock is common
to all countries. Anyway, because of diﬀerences in the industrial and ﬁnancial
structure among diﬀerent countries and regions, the impact of the monetary
policy shock is asymmetric. In this case diversiﬁcation can sensibly reduce
the risk of the portfolio of loans. Our analysis showed that an interest rate
shock produces a shift of the portfolio from bonds to loans, increasing the risk
absorption of the banking system. The possibility of higher diversiﬁcation
among loans would reduce the incentive to hold bonds and banks would
become more willing to rely on the traditional activity, smoothing the impact
of shocks. As a consequence, a more integrated banking sector should reduce
the impact of asymmetric shocks, and it would be more robust to the same
shocks than a decentralized one.19 If the eﬀect of interest rate shocks is
symmetric among countries the development of an integrate credit system
would not change the pattern of reaction of banks to this kind of shocks. In
general, the more asymmetric are the eﬀects of monetary policy, the more
important is the development of an integrated European banking system.
The impact of real shocks is felt by the credit system as an increase in
default that reduces net returns and increases the volatility of the portfolio.
According to our analysis, most banks, and large banks in particular, have
a strong incentive to smooth unevenly, increasing the cost of the smooth-
ing in the regions hit negatively by the shock, and reducing the cost in the
regions where the shock has a positive impact. The development of an inte-
19Mc Pherson and Waller [16] made a comparative analysis of the responses to bank
lending of the economies of US and Canada. They showed that in the US bank loans
cause, in the Granger sense, regional income ﬂuctuation and vice versa, while this eﬀect
cannot be detected for Canada. They attributed this diversity to existence of a nation-
wide banking sector with branches all around the country in Canada, while the banking
sector is still very fragmented in the US.
33grated European credit system would amplify the asymmetry in the impact
of real shocks. The reason is that the increased diversiﬁcation would increase
even further the incentive to smooth selectively. As a consequence, the more
asymmetric are the eﬀects of real shocks, the higher are the beneﬁts from a
decentralized banking system. This outcome could be moderated only when
the development of a common market would increase competition, reducing
the market power of every bank. But the political choice of a period of tran-
sition during which central banks make sure that the ownership of the main
banks is not under foreign control has already produced a strong increase in
the concentration of the sector.
The establishment of an integrated European banking system, dominated
by a few large players could drastically increase the problems of regional
asymmetries in the eﬀect of real shocks. Problems that could not be solved
by any scheme of insurance that do not imply a relevant redistribution and
would persist as long as the budget of the community would not be increased
substantially.20 The increase in competition caused by the establishment
of an integrated market for banking activities would certainly be beneﬁcial
for the economic system as a whole. Beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation would be
large as well, increasing the stability of the credit system and improving the
eﬃciency in the allocation of capital, increasing the availability of ﬁnance
in the most dynamic regions. But the cost represented by the procyclical
activity of the credit system, that might exacerbate the impact of real shocks
should not be underestimated.
4 Conclusion
Banks smooth the impact of shocks, providing insurance to ﬁrms, but they
smooth monetary policy and real shocks in diﬀerent ways. Interest rate
shocks tend to push banks towards more informational intensive assets, such
as commitment loans, strengthening the relationship between banks and
ﬁrms. They provide liquidity on demand, not transmitting the increase of
the interest rate in full. As a compensation for the insurance provided, they
charge a higher average interest rate to ﬁrms. The reaction of banks to
real shocks is aﬀected by the degree of diversiﬁcation of the portfolio of the
banks. The higher the diversiﬁcation of the portfolio, the higher the incen-
tive to smooth the shock unevenly, increasing the cost of the smoothing for
20See M´ elitz and Vori [18] and M´ elitz [17].
34the ﬁrms that are badly aﬀected by the shock, and reducing the cost for the
ﬁrms that are positively aﬀected.
A major change brought about by the introduction of the euro has been
the development of ﬁnancial markets in Europe. Large programs of priva-
tization have increased the role of stock markets, the eurobond market has
become competitive with the bond market of the US, and a large market
for securitized assets has taken place. The outcome of the process was the
adoption of an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance and the reduction
of the role of banks as the main source of ﬁnance for industrial ﬁrms. The
process has increased the possibilities of diversiﬁcation among assets issued
by the private sector, and the possibilities of diversiﬁcation of the risk among
diﬀerent industrial sectors, reducing the appeal of state bonds. Banks had
to become more market oriented and needed to increase their risk-taking ac-
tivity. Firms have beneﬁted from the increased competition in the ﬁnancial
markets, but when negative real shocks hit the economy, a large scale lemon
problem emerges in the market for bonds. In these conditions, ﬁrms have to
rely on banks, in order to obtain liquidity when cash-constrained. Since the
portfolio of banks is now more widely diversiﬁed, the opportunity cost of pro-
viding insurance, smoothing the shock, has increased. As a consequence, the
introduction of the common currency has reinforced the incentive to follow
the previous pattern of reaction to shocks.
The introduction of the common currency has increased notably the risk
insurance provided by the market. Households and ﬁnancial intermediaries
hold today a much more diversiﬁed portfolio, and the impact of idiosyncratic
shocks is widely distributed. The increase in bank’s risk-taking activity pro-
duces lower asymmetries in the eﬀect of monetary policy, but it might, on the
other hand, amplify regional asymmetries produced by real shocks. The fur-
ther step in the process would be the creation of a common European credit
market, transferring to the ECB the authority to regulate the market. The
development of an integrated banking system would be beneﬁcial because it
would increase competition in ﬁnancial markets and reinforce the stability
of the credit system. Asymmetries in the eﬀect of monetary policy would be
reduced, but the asymmetric impact of real shocks might be ampliﬁed, exac-
erbating regional disparities. In order to mitigate the problem, competition
within the banking system should be increased, and a policy of free entry for
new local banks should be put forward.
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